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1. 
The imagination has often been called “the faculty of possibility.”
Thus was it described by Baudelaire in a famous passage of his
Aesthetic Curiosities, where he crowned the imagination “the queen of
the faculties,” and even “the queen of truth,” adding that “possibility is
one of the provinces of truth.”1 Now, if the poet could assert his moder-
nity by loudly proclaiming an alliance between possibility, the imagina-
tion, and truth, then this was surely because Baudelaire’s profession of
faith had been prepared by at least two centuries of renewed, if labori-
ous, poetic and philosophical reflection on the faculty of possibility. The
modern philosophical tradition had long maintained ambivalent ties
with the imagination. Pascal repudiated it as the “mistress of error and
falsehood.”2 Malebranche, unable to hide his fascination with this
strangest of the mind’s faculties, characterized it as “the fool who is
pleased to play the fool.”3 To my eyes, the philosophy of the classical
period in Germany constituted a turning point in the conception of pos-
sibility as a province of the imagination, and reciprocally, in the concep-
tion of the imagination itself as a province of possibility. This article
thus examines the novel association between possibility and the imagi-
nation in Kant’s philosophy, beginning with the question of possibility
and ending with the role of the imagination therein. I maintain that
this association belongs to a socio-historical project, which is itself
rooted in the irreducibly practical decision to foster the freedom of the
subject—or better, to wager on the subject’s freedom to make phenome-
nal cognition possible. In the following pages, I will defend the thesis
that in order for transcendentalism to be coherent, it must acknowl-
edge its ultimately ‘problematic’ character and embrace this situation
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by recognizing this character not as a death sentence, but as the oppor-
tunity for a new birth.
“In the beginning was the Deed.”4 These are the words Goethe’s
Faust chooses to “translate into his dear German”5 from the opening of
the Gospel of Saint John, as though he had had the premonition that
he was about to embark on an adventure in which everything would
depend on an act of freedom—an act irreducible to θεωρία alone,
belonging instead to life and to force (Kraft). I propose to reframe
Kantianism within this Faustian scene. The end of the Enlightenment
saw the free establishment of a tribunal in which reason, acting as both
judge and jury, critiques itself in order to break free of the arbitrary
censures it had long endured (i.e., that of pure reason by empiricism as
well as that of experience by classical metaphysics). I will argue that
the establishment of this tribunal of reason should be recognized as an
act that, in and of itself, constitutes a wager on freedom. 
In Faust’s “Prologue in Heaven,” God is no longer the Leibnizian God.
Goethe’s God doesn’t know whether his creatures are free or not—as
Mephistopheles, the devil of negativity, points out to him.6 By sending
Mephistopheles to test Faust in order to assess the freedom of his crea-
tures, God inadvertently opens a space for a form of freedom that is at
least possible for human beings. But God does not thereby create free-
dom ex nihilo. Strictly speaking, Goethe’s God does nothing, so that the
performativity of his wager remains strictly negative. What God offers
Mephistopheles—and indirectly Faust himself—is his own incompetence,
his unawareness of a possible alliance within the human being between
reason, freedom, and the faculty of desire (as Kant may have put it).
Faust, in turn, proves unable to replace God’s ignorance with the apod-
ictic knowledge of his own freedom; he is only able to wager on it. It
thus becomes possible for there to be freedom within creation, and this
in turn presents an opportunity for the imagination to become the for-
mative power of human destiny. 
2. 
As is well known, freedom turns out to be theoretically undecidable in
the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason,7 whereas it is pre-
sented as a practical postulate in the Critique of Practical Reason.8 We
can neither affirm nor refute the reality of freedom in the sphere of
theoretical cognition, but we can—and even must—have recourse to
our own freedom in the sphere of practical action. Indeed, Kant goes a
step further by affirming the primacy of pure practical reason, whereby
the latter determines not only the interest (Interesse) of all the forces of
the mind (Gemütskräfte), but even its own interest (KpV 121; CPrR
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237). Accordingly, “in the union of pure speculative with pure practical
reason in one cognition, the latter has primacy, assuming that this
union is not contingent and discretionary but based a priori on reason
itself and therefore necessary” (ibid.). In its practical use, reason can
provide no cognition besides what theoretical reason can validate; but
since practical reason is accountable only to itself, the “summons” it
addresses to theoretical cognition is nonetheless dictated by an interest
whose necessity surpasses and eliminates any arbitrariness. When
practical reason takes the initiative and makes a demand with a view
to orienting theoretical reason, the former has priority on the presuppo-
sition that its demand is not gratuitous but enjoys a necessity grounded
in the a priori demand to realize freedom. Moreover, theoretical reason
as such, considered in abstracto, never expresses an interest, as Kant
specifies further on: “all interest is ultimately practical” (KpV 121;
CPrR 238). Speculative reason’s dependency vis-à-vis practical reason
is necessary, but this necessity itself is rooted in the postulate of free-
dom and, consequently, in the free interests of practical reason. 
How, then, can we not acknowledge that the very act of conceiving
philosophy in its entirety as a free self-critique, as a tribunal drawing
on the autonomy of reason to issue a verdict on this very autonomy,
already presupposes such a postulate and therefore represents an
interested wager on the freedom of reason? I recognize that this rein-
terpretation of Kant bears the mark of Fichte and also recalls the
German idealists’ characteristic strategy of making free forays into the
different Critiques, breaking the walls separating the various Kantian
jurisdictions in their pursuit of systematicity. I will suggest that the
Critique of Pure Reason should be regarded, in retrospect, as a wager
on freedom. Its strategic apparatus itself flows from Kant’s practical
postulate since, from the very first line of the text, the second Critique
shows its adherence to the audacious idea that reason can at least leg-
islate freely for itself, and that it therefore has this possibility. Reason
presupposes this ultimate possibility from the outset and only attempts
to justify it after the fact. An interest of practical reason guides the
critical act par excellence, namely the renunciation of any reference to
an external point of view that might exceed reason’s free reflection on
itself and thereby constitute a limit not assigned by reason to itself. To
a certain degree, Kant grants this point, albeit belatedly: in the
Transcendental Dialectic, he orients cognition toward the regulative
horizon of practical freedom (KrV A534/B562; CPR 533–4), while in the
preface to the B edition and again in the Dialectic, he invokes the inter-
est of human beings (KrV Bxxi–xxxii; CPR 112–8; KrV B423–4; CPR
454). Although the Critique does not explicitly make freedom—which it
problematically presupposes in its very project—a constitutive element
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of theoretical cognition, it nonetheless leaves clues that its readers can
glean in order to move past this aporia. 
On my view, even the transcendental deduction of the categories—
an abstract theoretical moment if ever there was one—is thus com-
manded by the practical interest of reason. The categories bespeak an
independent rationality henceforth in charge of itself and free in its
argumentative strategies, even though this rationality begins by prov-
ing that it cannot cognize itself in the objective mode of theoretical cog-
nition whose boundaries it circumscribes. It is worth stressing this
point today, when Kant (to his credit) still encompasses multiple epistemic
perspectives in both the continental and the analytic traditions, both of
which sometimes attempt to reduce the critical edifice to a particular
argumentative dimension (which is then isolated or even hypostasized)
without anchoring the system in an act, an attitude, or a specific pro-
cess—a shift of perspective later championed by the transcendental
philosophies of Fichte and Husserl.9
The Critique of Pure Reason thus constitutes an interested wager on
the possibility of reason’s autonomous self-examination, against the
backdrop of silence, i.e., the withdrawal of any answer that might have
come “from above.” We must now seek to understand the connection
between reason’s wager and the imagination. Reason’s “practical” act
ipso facto calls for a new understanding of possibility at all levels,
including the theoretical level, as well as an interpretation of Kant’s
novel reinvestment in the imagination as a resource for this strategy.
Indeed, I cannot evoke the imagination’s specific role without examin-
ing this faculty’s productive and creative aspects, not only as the result
of an historical context (which has been described countless times) but
as a participant in a project that is inextricably epistemological and
socio-historical. Through its establishment of a tribunal that is reason
itself, the Critique “performatively” opens a new form of modernity at
the zenith of the Enlightenment, radicalizing the project of the autonomy
of our practical interests (or our “tendencies,” as the Jena Romantics
might have put it) to which theoretical reason subjects itself. 
3.
In the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes, “I call
all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects
but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this ought to be
possible a priori [a priori möglich sein soll]” (KrV B25; CPR 133; trans.
mod.). This definition is an addition to the B edition, which appeared just
before the second Critique and accordingly devotes greater attention to
the problem of practical reason. In the corresponding passage in the A
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edition, Kant was content to restrict the term “transcendental” to the a
priori concepts of knowledge as opposed to the objects of knowledge per
se (KrV A11; CPR 133). But in the B edition, Kant introduces a singular
Sollen (ought): not only must our mode of cognition of objects be possi-
ble a priori, but it ought to be so. And at the opposite end of the Critique,
in the concluding lines of the section “On the Final Aim of the Natural
Dialectic of Human Reason,” which closes the “Appendix to the
Transcendental Dialectic,” Kant justifies the transcendental enterprise
by appealing to the philosopher’s “duty” (Pflicht) (KrV A703/B731; CPR
623) to resist dialectical illusion, although he acknowledges the latter’s
enduring “interest” (Interesse) (KrV A704/B732; CPR 623). Vainly
would one search the entire Critique, whether in the nooks of the
Transcendental Analytic or in the crannies of the Dialectic, for a principle
more fundamental than this demand, which in a sense is both inaugural
and terminal. In all of its parts, transcendental Wissenschaft contains a
practical imperative that immediately evokes duty: to show that there
ought to be a possibility a priori—itself cognizable a priori by the
philosopher—of serving the interest of reason without being fooled by
it, that is, without falling prey to dialectical illusion. To be sure, one
could construe this as a properly theoretical form of freedom, one dis-
tinct from practical reason. In this vein, some scholars have emphasized
the real, albeit relative, “autonomy” of cognitive judgments: the under-
standing’s spontaneity implies not only that it is the sole master of its
own house (i.e., of its pure concepts), but also that we can fall for illusion
only if theoretical judgment is fallible and thus capable of erring—a
risk that in turn makes the Transcendental Dialectic indispensable.
Here there is at least a hint of a negative freedom specific to the theo-
retical domain: “Insofar as the Dialectic retraces the genesis of transcen-
dental error, it presupposes a theoretical freedom which has allowed
itself to be led astray,” as Claude Piché has observed.10 But in my view,
the introductory Sollen of the Critique of Pure Reason expresses a
demand, prior to any theoretical autonomy, that the transcendental
should itself be possible; accordingly, I see this imperative as a sign of
practical freedom.
This practical demand is the outgrowth of an act of freedom, but
since we are trying to analyze theoretical cognition here, should we not
construe it as a kind of “transcendental hypothesis” in the sense that
Kant gives this term in “The Discipline of Pure Reason”? Kant explains
that this type of hypothesis involves employing an idea of reason (in
this case, freedom) to “explain natural things” (KrV A772/B800; CPR
660; trans. mod.). Of course, this oversteps the understanding in an
unacceptable manner, even though the hypothesis assumes that
something is given to reason for consideration, whereas the rational
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idea, considered in isolation, is a strictly “fictional” heuristic. However,
the more basic question of the present analysis does not concern the
explanation of natural things but only the problematic demand that
the philosopher be able to give an a priori explanation (and thus an
exposition and a deduction) of our a priori cognition of objects. A note
from the preface to the B edition adds an important qualification: 
In this Preface I propose the transformation in our way of thinking
presented in the Critique merely as a hypothesis, analogous to that
other hypothesis [viz., Copernicus’], only in order to draw our notice
to the first attempts at such a transformation, which are always
hypothetical, even though in the treatise itself it will be proved not
hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution of our
representations of space and time and from the elementary con-
cepts of the understanding. (KrV Bxxii; CPR 113; trans. mod.)
This is a remarkable statement! The Critique cannot rely on problem-
atic judgments (i.e., judgments whose affirmative or negative character
is merely possible) to ground cognition; therefore its transformation of
the way of thinking (Denkart) must be demonstrated apodictically.
However, apodictic proof ultimately rests on a metaphysical hypothesis,
which at the very least serves as a signpost. Indeed, the quoted passages
from the introduction and the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic
go much further than any theoretical hypothesis, as they express the
demand that the hypothesis of a Copernican revolution in philosophy
(not in the scientific cognition of the natural world) ought to be possi-
ble.11 It seems to me that the opening of the Critique of Pure Reason is
irreducibly problematic and furthermore that this problematicity is of a
practical nature.
Does this leave us with an intrinsic arbitrariness? My view is that it
does not. The condition of metaphysics at the time called for the practi-
cal decision to develop a transcendental science and even dictated its
theoretical architecture, and so history’s role in this renewal must be
duly recognized. Accordingly, this is not a sign of arbitrariness, but
rather of contingency. The a priori structures of cognition constitutively
depend on a Sollen—the echo of Kant’s Faustian bargain. Previously,
the Leibnizian ontological framework guaranteed that there was some-
thing rather than nothing thanks to divine perfection. Kant offers no
such transcendent necessity; instead, he holds that a transcendental
science ought to be possible a priori for reason. The latter commands
itself that this be so and assigns itself the task of providing an a priori
account of the elements that structure our experience of a “something”
that is henceforth just as contingent and precarious as the demand to
account for it a priori.12 Consequently, reason can only refer to the contin-
gency of its own demand in order to find within itself the laws capable of
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guaranteeing the possibility of experience. This practical imperative
constitutes the terminus a quo of finite rationality. Since the subject
ought to be able to find resources within herself for a free critique of her
own cognition—in accordance with her interest—she must also recog-
nize that her theoretical cognition of objects (whether ordinary or scien-
tific) depends on this free demand, even if the experience of theoretical
cognition is not itself, for Kant, an experience of freedom per se, since
reason does not directly legislate for cognition. 
4.
In the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition, that which is non-contradictory is
possible; the logical principle of non-contradiction immediately has an
ontological value. But although non-contradiction remains the highest
analytic principle for Kant, it tells us nothing in itself, being no more
than the conditio sine qua non of an analytic judgment, considered
independently of its content. Moreover, the principle of non-contradic-
tion is generally contaminated by a synthesis inadvertently introduced
into its classic formula, as Kant notes in the section “On the Supreme
Principle of All Analytic Judgments.” Having just demonstrated the
indispensability of the schematism, Kant naturally has temporal syn-
thesis in mind when he writes: “It is impossible for something to be
and not be at the same time” (KrV A152/B191; CPR 280). For Kant,
objective or real possibility—as opposed to merely logical possibility—is
what is possible in and through time. Correspondingly, Kant is willing
to grant to Leibniz that a thing that does not contradict itself on the
conceptual level is possible, with the proviso that when it comes to
objective validity—as opposed to strictly formal validity—only a thing
that does not contradict itself in time is possible. As for the supreme
principle of synthetic judgments, it is nothing other than possible expe-
rience itself, conceived as the power of producing the synthetic unity of
the manifold of intuition by coordinating the pure forms of sensibility
with the synthesis of the imagination and with transcendental apper-
ception. Only in accordance with these principles does Kant assert that
“the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same
time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and on this
account have objective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori” (KrV
A158/B197; CPR 283). Hence, that which is logically non-contradictory
is not necessarily possible in experience. For added measure, this point
is confirmed in the Analytic of Principles by the first of the “postulates
of empirical thought in general”: only the phenomenon is possible (KrV
A218/B265; CPR 321). For each of the categories of modality, the three
postulates respectively present the different synthetic judgments that
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the understanding is capable of producing a priori in view of the real—
hence schematized—use of the categories that had previously been
merely deduced in the Analytic of Concepts. The first postulate states it
thus: “Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accor-
dance with intuition and concepts) is possible” (KrV A218/B265; CPR
321). Possibility takes on the revolutionary form of the phenomenon. 
This certainly elucidates the relation between common or scientific
cognition and possibility, as well as their relation to necessity, since we
get two modalities for the price of one, so to speak. Possibility is that
which meets necessary criteria. Correspondingly, if the necessary con-
ditions are fulfilled (i.e., the object coheres with space, time, and the
categories, and this coordination takes place at the level of the imagina-
tion and of apperception), then a field of possible experience can open
up. Possibility is thus subject to necessity: if there are necessary laws,
then there is possibility. We will return to this relation shortly, but for
now, let us not lose sight of our starting point. We must bear in mind
that for Kant, necessity itself—the very necessity that makes experi-
ence possible—ought to be possible for the philosopher writing the
Critique. The general and necessary conditions of the possibility of
experience ought themselves to be a priori possible für uns (for us)—to
borrow a Hegelian phrase even though it may be infelicitous here—i.e.,
possible for Kant or for his readers. So, how is it possible for there to be
necessary laws that themselves derivatively make experience and theo-
retical cognition possible? How can we cognize these necessary laws
that make cognition possible? And how can we know that they are
themselves possible for us a priori? We cannot know this only according
to the rules that legitimize true cognition. Hence, the transcendental
cognition of what constitutes legitimate theoretical cognition based on
agreement with the formal conditions of experience itself contradicts
the first postulate. When Kant demonstrates the a priori possibility of
experience, he has no sensory experience of the principle that only sen-
sory experience is valid, nor can he explain why it should be possible
for him to transcend the conditions of the possibility of valid cognition
that had been determined during the self-examination of reason. 
This problem became the first focus of post-Kantian criticism.
According to Schulze and Maimon, followed even more strongly by
Fichte, Kant always presupposes the modern subject-object relation
without treating it as a problem.13 Kant starts from this relation as if it
were a fact to which he subjects the transcendental philosopher’s
knowledge nolens volens, so to speak. Kant assumes not only that there
is always a relation to the object but also that the knowing and repre-
senting subject (particularly the subject of modern science) produces
propositions—whether analytic or synthetic—whose validity is simply
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given. The transcendental philosopher has the task of supplying the a
priori conditions of the possibility of judgments of experience whose
validity is a fact, given that they are anchored in the fact of experience.
Kant draws the conditions of possibility, i.e., the foundation, from
something that he has already implicitly grounded. As a result, the
foundation ultimately depends on what has been grounded and is con-
sequently never examined per se, as this would be absurd. Indeed, the
transcendental cognition that valid cognition depends on the relation
between a sensible intuition and a concept of the understanding is
never sensibly intuited by the philosopher, who voluntarily suppresses
the status of her own discourse and of transcendental meta-cognition.
The philosopher contents herself with legislating on the basis of what
has already been settled by the “facts”; she merely has to prove its a
priori possibility in a strictly regressive and a posteriori manner. While
this strategy may be partially deliberate, it nonetheless leads to a num-
ber of aporias. For my part, I believe these problems should not only be
recognized but also cultivated in their paradoxical fruitfulness. But
what does this imply? 
The irreducibly Humean core of Kantian transcendentalism—namely
its reference to “empirical facts”—thus suggests an apagogic mode of
proof. This was first pointed out by Maimon, who viewed a return to
Hume as the only possible solution,14 and more recently by Antoine
Grandjean, whose excellent analysis also brings out the richness of the
Kantian strategy.15 According to Kant, the philosopher adduces indirect
proofs discursively and reflexively, without producing any intuition or
concept herself (in contradistinction to the mathematician, who is capa-
ble of immediately constructing her concepts in pure intuition). But in
order to secure her own foundation, the philosopher must always refer
to a truth that has been factually accepted elsewhere yet never proven as
such.16 Thus, despite what is stated in the third rule of “The Discipline of
Pure Reason,” namely that philosophical proofs “must never be apagogic
but always ostensive” (i.e., they must start from a principle and derive its
logical consequence directly) (KrV A789/B817; CPR 668), and despite
the fact that the antinomies deceive us precisely because both the the-
sis and the antithesis rest on apagogic proofs, the apagogic proof
nonetheless enjoys a privileged status throughout the critical discourse.
There can be no denying that Kant was ambivalent about which
method of proof he considered ideal. Although the third rule specifi-
cally calls for ostensively resolving the conflicts engendered by the ideas
of reason, which are by definition cut off from any reference to possible
experience, Kant nevertheless implies that the ostensive proof should be
the model for the entire critical method. And yet the Critique only
licenses the philosopher to proceed indirectly. Conversely to the ostensive
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method, the apagogic proof starts from a fact or a consequence and then
retraces the principle that made it possible; the principle is thus reached
only indirectly.
According to the fourth section of “The Discipline of Pure Reason,”
this can be done using either of two conditional inferences. Using
modus ponens, one infers the truth of the principle from the truth of
the consequence (KrV A790/B818; CPR 669). Using modus tollens
(which Kant ultimately identifies with the apagogic proof in the strong
sense), one infers the validity of the thesis negatively by demonstrating
the absurdity or contradictory nature of the opposite thesis, i.e., one
traces the falsity of a consequence back to the falsity of its principle in
order to then justify the opposing principle (KrV A791/B819; CPR 669).
In a sense, the Critique as a whole argues that experience would be
incomprehensible if the laws it adduces were otherwise: experience
would not be spatio-temporal—but that would be absurd; experience
would not be structured by causality—but that would also be absurd;
and so on. This modus operandi sometimes proceeds in a veiled way in
Kant’s philosophy, but it can always be spotted at the major argumen-
tative junctures, including in the sphere of practical philosophy. For
instance, if there were no causality through freedom in addition to natural
causality, then the experience of the moral law within us would be
impossible; yet we do in fact have this experience of the moral law
within us, which is the source of the “fact of reason” (Faktum der
Vernunft) (see KpV 31; CPrR 164). Therefore, there must be a free
causality, at least in an analogical form. The fact that the moral law
arises from inside the subject with an unshakable force and is pre-
sented as a pure “fact of reason” that is ipso facto totally independent
from “possible experience” (to which the first postulate restricted cogni-
tion in the theoretical domain) does not change the apagogic strategy; it
only gives transcendental discourse a surplus of facticity in a sphere
where there can be no foundation but only an exposition. 
That said, there is no reason to condemn Kant’s ambiguity regarding
the kind of proof he favors. As I stated above, critical reason has de
jure no reason  to pledge allegiance to any particular argumentative
strategy, including the apagogic proof, since it can always start from—
and come back to—possible experience in any way that the “tribunal of
reason” (Gerichtshof) may deem necessary (KrV A xii; CPR 101). Indeed,
Kant’s philosophical process, or the modulation of his gaze, takes prece-
dence over any reification of an argument per se. For all that—and this
is the crucial point—Kant provides no exemplary justification of his pro-
cess, of what he himself is doing as he traces the contours of objective
validity (using this or that argument). He does not show that philosophi-
cal reason encounters and characterizes itself, at the very least, through
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the apagogic procedure; on the contrary, the Kantian discourse deliber-
ately obscures its secret motives. Far from practically engendering
space, time, causality, etc.—as Fichte aimed to do through his free reflec-
tion on his own philosophical activity (whereby freedom will become the
sole true unconditioned principle in the Wissenschaftslehre)—Kant
merely sets out the synthetic rules of cognition and action. He does not
immediately link these rules to his own self-reflection, but rather discov-
ers them after the fact, i.e., on the basis of what had been factually given.
This approach is acceptable, of course, yet it is never truly justified.
Transcendental rules ought to exist if the experience of nature or of
morality is given within the human being. The connection causes signifi-
cant problems in Kantianism only because it comes belatedly; it is
always relative to a possible experience set outside of the philosophizing
self rather than in an immediate relation to the philosophizing self.
Therefore, the choice of which form of argument to employ amounts to
little, insofar as it is always relative to something given to which the
philosopher will establish a connection using the argument of her
choosing (generally the apagogic proof) without ever really explaining
the meaning of what she is doing. 
In the final analysis, the only thing that is not “given” is the tran-
scendental element itself, for the philosopher cannot include herself in
her own account of valid cognition. By making the objective experience
of the world or of the moral law possible, transcendental discourse
always exempts itself from the procedures that it institutes to legit-
imize the representations that have already been instituted and tacitly
assumed to be valid. This is what Grandjean calls the “factuality” of
transcendental discourse, which is always “without a why.”17 However,
transcendental discourse does not thereby constitute an arbitrary petitio
principii, whether as a whole or in one of its moments. In the theoretical
sphere, it rests on the conviction that the sensible factually exists as a
pure multiplicity that ultimately ought to be unified by the powers of
the understanding in order to be comprehensible, as it de facto is.18 But
one possibility stubbornly remains as neither unthinkable nor actual:
the metaphysical possibility of an incomprehensible or chaotic experi-
ence, from which we are protected only by the fact of its apparently
ordered character. 
This brings us to the powerful idea, aptly stressed by Grandjean, that
“actual experience is metaphysically contingent.”19 One could surely say
something similar in the practical domain, moreover, and assert that
moral experience has a certain metaphysical contingency. But I would
like to add the following point: while transcendental discourse is content
to use the apagogic proof to supply the a priori conditions of sensible
experience on the basis of its contingent actuality, this discourse, in all
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of its parts (theoretical and practical), nonetheless ultimately rests on
another contingency already contained in the Critique of Pure Reason
from its very beginning—the contingency of the act through which
transcendental discourse becomes a demand (the Sollen of the intro-
duction). This demand does not pertain to the factuality of sense data
even though it is just as contingent; its contingency is that of the practi-
cal demand of transcendental discourse as the guarantor of a possibility
that is specifically human—i.e., no longer dependent on what is possible
or impossible for God—and that is nonetheless capable of making sense. 
In my view, the contingency of this free wager on possibility is not
grounded in reason; rather, it is what grounds reason. At one extreme,
we can never account for the meta-possibility we have of cognizing the
necessary structures that themselves make experience possible,
because we gave ourselves this possibility in an act of freedom that is
in itself unconditioned and contingent. At the other extreme, we are
condemned to a circle: we rely on the given in order to ground it, in
turn, through our own cognitive structures. And although these struc-
tures are supposed to be strictly conditioning, we find them only by
jumping from one conditioned to the next, because both the given and
our own cognitive structures are equally contingent. The tribunal thus
makes its ruling only on the basis of what is given to it contingently.
But that’s just it: the inaugural Sollen attests that this characterization
of the given as contingency is ultimately rooted in a practical demand,
an interest. But every interest of reason should be duly historicized.
The interest in the present case cannot be understood independently of
the socio-historical context of the Enlightenment, which called for a tri-
bunal of reason to be established. Paradoxically though, Kant does not
fully incorporate this historical dimension of reason’s interests into the
Critique, unlike the grand philosophies of history later produced by the
German idealists and Romantics. At any rate, it is a free and practical
choice on Kant’s part to assign himself this contingency as both termi-
nus a quo and terminus ad quem of his transcendental philosophy.20
But let me reframe these points in positive terms. The Sollen is cer-
tainly the unconditioned and indemonstrable foundation of an approach
that in fact draws its foundation and starting point from its own contin-
gency—although here we are dealing not with a given fact but rather
with an act of freedom. Here, contingency is the accidental abyss conse-
quent upon the Faustian God’s incompetence, or if one prefers, the
effect of Kant’s banning the metaphysicians’ principle of sufficient rea-
son and his subjective reversal of possibility. From the Critique of Pure
Reason onward, the Kantian Sollen ultimately expresses the demand
that the contingency of experience provide us with an opportunity to
use our equally contingent a priori cognitive architecture to make
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meaning and forms possible—forms that are no longer considered to
have been caused by God for all eternity. This Sollen is the wager that
there may be meaning, not in spite of contingency but thanks to it; it
expresses a practical interest in the a priori possibility of meaning even
in the face of the radical contingency of experience and indeed by
means of our cognitive structures’ being capable of accommodating it.
Although the transcendental is defined as general and necessary, this
necessity is not absolute; it is always relative to a factual experience,
whose contingency circularly affects transcendental discourse itself,
which will never account for its own possibility.21
The imagination thus becomes the instrument of the (Kantian or
Faustian) wager on possibility. It materializes this wager by providing
possible experience with a space and a synthetic form—or rather sev-
eral forms, none of which truly has a raison d’être and all of which are
carved out by the freedom to invent oneself. After all, it was necessary
in the first place to freely demand that there be possibility a priori.
Needless to say, this thesis cannot be defended solely on the basis of
the doctrinal content of the Critique of Pure Reason, where the produc-
tive imagination is subordinated to the understanding, which itself only
enjoys a relative freedom insofar as it merely thinks what intuition
supplies it with according to laws (while leaving a certain amount of
leeway to the power of judgment). One could, of course, give greater
weight to the “free play of the faculties,” of which imagination is the
orchestra conductor, as in the Analytic of the Beautiful, or appeal to the
tension between reason and the imagination over the latter’s audacious
encroachment on its territory, as in the Analytic of the Sublime. Here I
will limit myself to the first Critique, though I will play Kant against
himself by assuming that the strictly epistemological renewal of possi-
bility depends on a wager the consequences of which may not all be
tenable but which are nonetheless operative in the critical strategy. 
5.
But first, let us push the concept of possibility a bit further. As Kant
explains at the beginning of the Analytic of Concepts, the understanding
is not merely a reservoir of concepts; rather, it acts, i.e., it judges. While
it is not to be confused with the power of judgment (Urteilskraft), its
functions only become accessible to us when expressed in the form of a
judgment. Given that a “function” (Funktion) is defined as “the unity of
the action of ordering different representations under a common one”
(KrV A68/B93; CPR 205), the understanding never relates immediately
to the object but only to other representations (concepts or intuitions),
and it must seek to unify these by determining each indeterminate
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representation in a judgment. As is well known, the table of judgments
provides the guiding thread for the discovery of the categories. Here I
am interested only in modality, which Kant recognizes as “a quite spe-
cial function of [judgments], which is distinctive in that it contributes
nothing to the content of the judgment . . . but rather concerns only the
value of the copula in relation to thinking in general” (KrV A74/B99–100;
CPR 209). A modal judgment can be “problematic,” when the assertion
or denial is considered merely possible; “assertoric,” when the asser-
tion or denial is considered actual and thus imbued with an objective
value; or “apodictic,” when the assertion or denial is necessary.22
Ian S. Blecher has recently emphasized the progressive and cumulative
character of the values of modal judgments (based on KrV A76/B101; CPR
209–10). He shows that while every judgment is always problematic,
assertoric, or apodictic, the disjunction is in fact inclusive: “The problem-
atic judgment already includes the representation that it is the first stage
in a progress culminating in apodeictic judgment.”23 The first is the ter-
minus a quo of the judging activity, and the second its terminus ad
quem, whereby the modalities are “moments [Momente] of thinking in
general” (KrV A76/B101; CPR 210). Such a statement, of course, has no
meaning strictly in terms of the logical classification of judgments, but in
fact Blecher is using the Aristotelian vocabulary of “act” and “poten-
tial”: the problematic moment is a potential assertion, while the actual
assertion itself has the potential for apodictic necessity, i.e., actual
necessity. Blecher’s aim is not to psychologize the power of judgment’s
empirical learning process—even if judgment is intrinsically connected
to learning—but instead to capture the progressive character of the log-
ical form of judgment (prior to schematization, of course).24 Crucially,
modality in this sense refers to the form of every judgment: the theory
of formal modality is “a theory of the formal act of judging.”25 In other
words, modality directs our understanding of every judging activity
whereby the concept of a judgment in general is described as an intrin-
sically modal act, as an instance that is always potentially apodictic
but that, in my view, must first and foremost be actually problematic.
To judge is to problematize in view of apodictic cognition. 
But what of modality’s specific function? For the most part, the other
functions of judgment literally give form to the content of the judgment,
leaving an indelible mark. When one formulates a universal judgment
(e.g., “All humans are mammals”), the form of quantity has an immedi-
ate effect on the content of the judgment: “all humans” and “a human”
are two very different representations. The modal function of judgment,
by contrast, varies the value of the copula but tells us nothing about
the content of the judgment; it merely invites us to specify the position
of what is being judged with respect to the thought of the subject. The
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same conclusion must be drawn concerning the categories of modality
formed by the following three pairs: possibility and impossibility; exis-
tence and non-existence; necessity and contingency. In the elucidation
of the postulates of empirical thinking, Kant reiterates and clarifies his
reasoning: 
The categories of modality have this peculiarity: as a determina-
tion of the object they do not augment the concept to which they are
ascribed in the least, but rather express only the relation to the fac-
ulty of cognition. If the concept of a thing is already entirely com-
plete, I can still ask about this object whether it is merely possible, or
also actual, or, if it is the latter, whether it is also necessary? No fur-
ther determinations in the object itself are hereby thought; rather, it
is only asked: how is the object itself (together with all its determina-
tions) related to the understanding and its empirical use, to the
empirical power of judgment, and to reason (in its application to
experience)? (KrV A219/B266; CPR 322)
Predicating the possibility or the impossibility, the existence or the
non-existence, the necessity or the contingency of the object of a repre-
sentation—all of this points to the work of the understanding. Without
adding to the determination of the object, it brings all the other cate-
gories back to their empirical use through modality. The understanding
demands that all the categories really relate to experience via modality,
i.e., relate to the possibility, actuality, or necessity of things, and not
merely express the form of thinking analytically. For instance, the
mathematical categories (quantity and quality) might have limited
themselves to the latter function, were they not being constantly
brought back to the empirical use of the understanding by the dynami-
cal categories, especially modality. In the “Systematic Representation of
All the Synthetic Principles of the Understanding” (the third section of
the Analytic of Principles), Kant presents this remarkable passage: 
In the application of the pure concepts of understanding to possible
experience the use of their synthesis is either mathematical or
dynamical: for it pertains partly merely to the intuition, partly to
the existence of an appearance in general. The a priori conditions of
intuition, however, are necessary throughout in regard to possible
experience, while those of the existence of the objects of a possible
empirical intuition are in themselves only contingent. Hence the
principles of the mathematical use will be unconditionally neces-
sary, i.e., apodictic, while the principles of the dynamical use, to be
sure, also carry with them the character of an a priori necessity,
but only under the condition of empirical thinking in an experience,
thus only mediately and indirectly; consequently these do not con-
tain the immediate evidence that is characteristic of the former
(though their universal certainty in relation to experience is not
thereby injured). (KrV A160–1/B199–200; CPR 284)
67
DUMONT/KANT’S WAGER ON POSSIBILITY
The synthetic use of the categories of quantity and of quality is mathe-
matical insofar as it conditions intuition as such. The synthetic use of
the categories of relation and of modality is dynamical insofar as it
bears only on the existential position of what is judged. The mathemat-
ical principles are necessary, according to Kant, because without them
intuition (including pure intuition) would simply not be possible. The
dynamical principles are contingent, since when they are applied—and
by definition they are not necessarily applied, as they first require an
empirical sensation—they certainly coordinate a priori with the sensi-
ble material supplied by intuition, but without adding anything to their
objective determination. They produce only a mediate and discursive
appraisal according to the empirical modulation of the position of exis-
tence. The same goes for the categories of relation: the use of causality
only yields “analogies of experience,” as Kant explains in the section of
the same name, which allow one to say how the thing one is judging is
causally connected in time to A, B, or C, as regards its existence but not
with respect to its pure intuitive possibility. 
For Kant, heir to the mathesis universalis of modernity, mathemat-
ics always represents the path of knowledge, as it always tells us what
we can cognize about things a priori, independently of the question of
their existence (by anticipating the very form of the appearance to be
intuited according to its extension and intension), but not indepen-
dently of sensibility, of course, since we are dealing with transcendental
categories rather than the categories of formal logic. Thus, according to
Kant, the mathematical categories enjoy apodictic evidence, yet the lat-
ter remains relative to possible experience. 
The understanding does not give up its synthetic function in the case
of the dynamical categories; however, it limits itself to subjectively syn-
thesizing the concept with an existential position tied to its empirical
use yet without synthesizing the object itself. Because relation and
modality introduce some leeway into the configuration of the represen-
tation’s meaning, the subject is called upon to always remember that it
is anchored in the understanding, since the object does not dictate its
own existential position. In the “Appendix to the Transcendental
Dialectic,” Kant confirms what he had already subtly alluded to in KrV
A179/B222; CPR 297–8: he goes so far as to make the dynamical princi-
ples of the understanding strictly regulative, in contradistinction to the
mathematical principles, which are fully constitutive. To be sure, he
also specifies that while the dynamical laws are merely regulative with
respect to intuition, they are no less constitutive of experience as such,
since at the very least “they make possible a priori the concepts without
which there is no experience” (KrV A664/B692; CPR 602), even though
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they do not make intuition possible, but rather endow it with a surplus
of meaning. 
6.
If Fichte was Kant’s Mephistopheles in that he forced negativity to
fully unite with rationality well beyond the Critique, I will now try sur-
reptitiously to manipulate Kant in a relatively Fichtean spirit. To put it
plainly: I will play with the effacement—or ambiguity, depending on
one’s point of view—of the status of Kant’s discourse in order to assess
the paradoxical fruitfulness of his approach with respect to the question
of possibility in the sense I have developed here, i.e., in its ambiva-
lence.26 Earlier I asked how it might be possible a priori for necessity—
the a priori structures that make cognition possible—to itself be possible
“for us”? We do not know, since transcendental discourse—which is con-
tingent and without a “why,” yet it is summoned by the practical
demand that its a priori possibility be capable of having objective valid-
ity—eludes every explanation according to the mode of cognition that it
itself makes possible and legitimate.27 But can we not apply Kant’s dis-
course to himself? By jumping from conditioned to conditioned without
ever attaining a foundation grounded elsewhere—unless it is in the
hypothetical Sollen of the introduction that Kant plays close to his
chest—can we not force him to admit that the Critique is problematic
in its entirety, that its assertions about the conditions of possible cogni-
tion (contained in the first postulate of empirical thinking) are them-
selves only possible? 
Recall the passage cited above (KrV A160–1/B199–200; CPR 284): using
this circularity, which Fichte will later deem vicious,28 but which we
know is inevitable in the Critique, Kant applied the categories to them-
selves, as if they were already valid, in order to ground their synthetic
use in the Analytic of Principles. Thus he affirmed both that the mathe-
matical principles of their synthetic use were necessary and therefore
possessed an apodictic content, and that the dynamical principles of
their synthetic use were contingent (even though the categories have
an indirect a priori necessity in cases where their strictly subjective syn-
thesis operates—an operation that is entirely relative to the empirical
use of the understanding and therefore is arbitrary). But the necessity
and the contingency directing the two synthetic uses of the categories are,
of course, the modal categories, i.e., the dynamical categories that yield a
discursive and mediated cognition of the existence of objects in experience,
which they are content to regulate rather than constitute (according to
the “Appendix to the Transcendental Deduction”). Consequently, even the
necessary mathematical principles nonetheless attest, at their meta-level,
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to a kind of modality that is meant not to determine the least content of
a judgment but only to regulate it and to vary the meaning of the copula
at the subject’s discretion. Some Kantians will no doubt find this absurd.
Not without reason, to be sure, since there is a risk of plunging tran-
scendental philosophy into skepticism, which Kant always repudiated.
Nonetheless, the Kantian difficulty is a fruitful one.
The dynamical principles do not concern the construction of the
object qua magnitude, as the mathematical principles do; rather, they
concern the object’s existence, either insofar as the latter is inserted
into the totality of nature (as in the “Analogies of Experience”) or in
direct relation to the subject of the judgment (as in “The Postulates of
Empirical Thought in General”). But by specifying the domain of appli-
cation of all the principles in terms of modality, could it be that Kant
wants to suggest, in a roundabout way, that every one of these synthetic
principles of the understanding—even the mathematical principles—
only has validity relative to the ultimate possibility that something
should give itself as an existence to be judged, and also that the condi-
tions of the possibility of its being given could be provided a priori? Kant
does not seem to be able to guarantee this possibility to his reader, since
in the Critique of Pure Reason he presented it as a wager. Accordingly,
subjectivity might secretly be invited to act as if all the synthetic princi-
ples relate to existence, at times in an apodictic mode (mathematically),
and at other times in a problematic mode (dynamically), while knowing
full well that even apodicticity has an “as if” and therefore regulative
status. As a modality, this apodicticity is no more than an extension of
the inaugural problematicity, since the categories of modality, being
contingent, regulate every use of the categories. Why? Surely because
the origin of transcendental philosophy as such has itself been hypo-
thetically demanded, and there is literally “no reason” for Kant to sub-
stitute an ultimate necessity for the hypothesis that transcendental
philosophy, indeed a transcendental world, ought to be possible.
That we should now be approaching the limit of absurdity is a conse-
quence of the pact signed by Kant—and by all of classical German phi-
losophy after him—with the devil of negativity, Mephistopheles: by
substituting an a priori possibility for the Schulmetaphysik’s principle of
sufficient reason, they run up against the possibility of the impossible—
the possibility of losing the transcendental wager. Giving up the princi-
ple of sufficient reason means welcoming a transcendental philosophy
whose possibility, without a “why,” must become the object of a belief—
like the God of the old metaphysics.29 The God of German metaphysics,
like the God of Goethe’s “Prologue in Heaven,” has withdrawn himself
by default, by the absence of a response, and not because one could
immediately speak the language of necessity in place of the traditional
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God (as Spinoza does, for example). This would amount to short-circuit-
ing the inexplicable contingency of a possibility, which must be possible
since the tribunal of reason, surprised by its unforeseen powers, wagers
on its own possibility, making the Critique entirely problematic rather
than apodictic. At least the free choice of the problematicity or apodictic-
ity of the critical discourse is left to the discretion of the philosopher
who deploys her freedom in transcendentalism. 
Here it is quite difficult for Kant not to overburden the contract with
skepticism and negativity already signed by Descartes a century and a
half earlier, but which is now radicalized as never before in modernity.
Not all a priori lawfulness can be necessary—and thereby open the
field of possible experience to common or scientific consciousness—with-
out first being possible, or having to be possible, for the philosopher who
seeks to account for it a priori and who wishes to accommodate this
meta-possibility in its contingency without determining it “from above”
and thereby eliminating it. The Critique must be repaired, or have a
verdict issued on it, using the elements of its own transcendental the-
ory, which turn out to be already conditioned by the wager of their a
priori possibility—which, in other words, turn out to be ultimately con-
tingent, problematic, and even regulative. Hence Kant uses the cate-
gories that he assumes to be valid in order to validate their usage. While
the a priori necessity of the categories is itself relative “from below” to
possible experience and is therefore hypothetical (as Kant notes in the
third of the Postulates of Empirical Thought in General),30 it is also rela-
tive “from above” to the very possibility of the a priori cognition of the
philosopher who demands, in virtue of the Sollen, that it be thus. 
Surprised by her new powers, the philosopher still proves able to dis-
criminate between possible and impossible cognition, and thereby
between possible and impossible objects. The enigma no longer consists
in knowing why there is something rather than nothing, but rather in
determining how possible cognition (i.e., cognition corresponding to the
first postulate) and impossible cognition (which does not correspond to
this postulate and deludes itself, i.e., metaphysical discourse) can both
be subjected to the critical point of view and be possible for the transcen-
dental philosopher. The “Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection,” which
closes the Transcendental Analytic, enjoins Kant—who, in writing the
Critique itself, has de facto already transcended the only cognition he
regards as valid (cognition of phenomena)—to make good use of his
“reflection” (Überlegung) in order to assign diverse representations to
their places without making mistakes and to prevent any confusion
between the empirical and transcendental uses of the understanding
(KrV A260–4/B316–20; CPR 366–8). Such a confusion is natural, since
the object in general calls for the distinction between the possible object
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and the impossible object. To repeat, the surprise is no longer that
there is something instead of nothing, since there is always an object
for the tribunal tasked with issuing a verdict on what is given to it,
that is, when reason reflexively scrutinizes its immanent conditions of
possibility. Rather, the surprise is that this object may be either possi-
ble—and can therefore constitute a “something”—or impossible, in
which case it becomes one of the forms of the concept of “nothing.” 
Since it is no longer God who decides what is possible or impossible,
the Kantian tribunal demands via the inaugural Sollen that this power
rightfully devolve to itself; yet it also receives this deciding power pas-
sively, in a completely accidental manner. Testing a freedom without
precedent in modernity, the tribunal receives a propaedeutic aid in the
form of the “table of nothing” that closes the “Amphiboly of Concepts of
Reflection” and the Transcendental Analytic by presenting the prob-
lematic object as the sole guiding thread for transcendental reflection: 
The highest concept with which one is accustomed to begin a tran-
scendental philosophy is usually the division between the possible
and the impossible. But since every division presupposes a concept
that is to be divided, a still higher one must be given, and this is
the concept of an object in general (taken problematically, leaving
undecided whether it is something or nothing). Since the categories
are the only concepts that relate to objects in general, the distinc-
tion of whether an object is something or nothing must proceed in
accordance with the order and guidance of the categories. (KrV
A290/B346; CPR 382)
The object in general must therefore always be considered, in the
first instance, in its problematic character, and thus we can say retro-
spectively that it must reach the imagination when the latter institutes
the phenomenal order. If this amphibological reflection, which is poste-
rior and so to speak optional, rules on the possible or impossible status
of an ultimately problematic object, must not the imagination confront
problematicity? To be sure, as the faculty of the possible but not of the
impossible, the imagination cannot give life, so to speak, to the four
objects of the “table of nothing.” They cannot be phenomenalized
because the two ends of the synthetic chain of the “subjective deduc-
tion” of the A edition—apprehension in intuition and recognition in the
concept (KrV Axvii; CPR 103)—always fall short in one way or another.
The imagination thus has no constructive synthesis to offer: it cannot
make that which is absent persist by reproducing it in the present if
there hasn’t been a primordial presence behind the absence. Whatever
the differences between the two editions of the Critique (interpreted
countless times since the famous Davos debate between Heidegger and
Cassirer), it can be agreed that the productive imagination is not cre-
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ative in the sphere of theoretical cognition. Neither is it creative in the
sphere of possible experience—as it must first be given a manifold of
intuition consolidated into a synoptic view—nor a fortiori in the experi-
ence of impossible objects, i.e., in the sphere of impossible experience.
Moreover, the imagination obviously has nothing to schematize in the
case of the four figures of “nothing.” Only possible experience is the
first effect of the imagination and of the formal synthesis of self-con-
sciousness, i.e., transcendental apperception (as emphasized in the B
edition). As Kant explains in his presentation of the table of categories,
this is so because synthesis in general is “the mere effect of the imagi-
nation, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without
which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom
even conscious” (KrV A78/B103; CPR 211).
Thus, the transcendental imagination of the first Critique only rep-
resents the capacity of shaping the contingency that it receives and
that it does not truly account for, at least not in the Leibnizian sense of
a sufficient reason. At the zenith of the German Enlightenment, Kant
grants the imagination the power not to eliminate contingency but on
the contrary to take advantage of the occasion of contingency in order
to ensure the synthetic unity demanded by subjectivity and thereby to
generate forms, figures, and ultimately meaning. But why is the imagi-
nation not creative at the theoretical level? To be sure, the imagination
is productive—one could even say constructive—in the theoretical
sphere. Already in mathematics it constructs the concept prescribed by
the understanding in intuition, and it does not cease constructing in this
way elsewhere, if one grants that temporalizing is equivalent to con-
structing the synthetic unity of understanding and intuition. Nonetheless,
something must be given to it “from below” (by pure or empirical intu-
ition) and “from above” (a prescription issued by the understanding). But
this twofold given—the sensation and the prescription—is not created by
the imagination. The different figures of “nothing” are strictly speaking
unimaginable; they embody the external limit of contingency in the the-
oretical context. They are unknowable, to be sure, but not unthinkable
for the philosopher, in whose eyes these impossible figures are, so to
speak, the deposit, or relic, of the initial wager on possibility. This is
why, for the great majority of commentators, it is only in the third
Critique that the imagination will become not only creative, but also
free.31 More generally, and notably since Manfred Riedel’s work,32
Kantianism has often been retroactively reconstructed from the
Critique of the Power of Judgment. While it is not possible to incorpo-
rate the latter text here, I will conclude by plumbing the depth of the
wager on possibility solely with the resources that Kant had at his dis-
posal in the first Critique. 
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7.
I have described the inaugural wager of the critical enterprise and the
intrinsically problematic establishment of a tribunal commensurate to
this task, which assigns itself the object in general, i.e., the problematic
object, as its first object. And here is my hypothesis, which flows from a
“critical heuristic,” so to speak, rather than from a strict evaluation of
Kant’s doctrine: the wager, the establishment of the tribunal, and the
problematic object belong to the imagination as a problematic faculty,
or rather as the power of problematizing practical freedom at the very
point where it devotes itself to theoretical cognition. This freedom is
always problematic, for it is situated between two contingencies: a con-
tingency “from above,” since the freedom of reason examining itself is
the subject of a demand—a wager, in fact, that reason cannot account
for as such but must on the contrary use as a basis for establishing
itself as a tribunal; and a contingency “from below,” since the a priori
rules that structure cognition but that were first made possible by this
hypothetical freedom take advantage of multiple facticities that were
simply given before being grounded. Correspondingly, epistemology is
called upon to act as if its assertions were true, whereas their “truth” is
first and foremost an extension of possibility.33 Can the imagination
serve as the instrument of a problematic freedom, providing the latter
with the reflexive strategy it needs (the tribunal) and the equivocal
object that must be freely judged?
Supporting this hypothesis is the proposal by Fichte’s Romantic stu-
dents to employ the imagination, intimately tied to practical reason, to
“plasticize” (plastisieren)34 all the elements of the transcendental theory
as if they intimately belonged to it. Through modality, all the categories
would thus become “liquid” (flüssig),35 to use the forceful expression of
Ernst Bloch, who drew inspiration from Friedrich Schlegel’s lectures
on logic (delivered in Cologne in 1805–1806) to elaborate his conception
of utopia.36 The modality at issue in the Critique of Pure Reason, accord-
ing to Schlegel, does not really have to do with categoriality insofar as
it does not determine the object but rather signals the involvement of
the understanding restrained to its empirical use.37 For Schlegel, if the
“determination of the representation [Vorstellung] can progress to infin-
ity,”38 it is also because judgment and its underlying categories are
always potentially apodictic, in the sense that this apodicticity is at bot-
tom always transitory and constantly brought back to a problematic
status. Indeed, the entire schematism of the imagination belongs to a
modality that has no category, as every schema always presents itself
as a “transposition of the possible onto the real.”39 The schema adds
nothing to the content of the concepts it renders sensible but merely
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gives them a transitory objective validity in virtue of its capacity to
make possible a determination of the object by the categories. Keeping
to the edge of possibility, the schema represents the infinite, ultimately
contingent power to modulate the thought of a given that is itself ulti-
mately contingent. Such a power even makes Kant uncharacteristically
lyrical. In his “Reflections on Anthropology,” in which he comments on
Wolff, Tetens, and Baumgarten, while simultaneously constructing his
own critical system, Kant writes: “Idealism of phenomena: we are
partly their creators depending on the standpoint [Standpunkt] we
adopt. Poet(s) [Dichter].”40 Although these “Reflections” foreshadow the
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View more than the Critique of
Pure Reason itself, one can also grant the schematism a poetic function
in the Critique. To be sure, the imagination does not have a creative
function in the strong sense, but it does invent rules—operational
methods that enable the application of the categories insofar as the
schema always has the potential for such an application to sensible
experience and thus has a thoroughly “possibilizing” power. 
The interdependence, the kinship, indeed the virtual identity between
the schematism and modality—understood as the never-completed trans-
lation of possibility to actuality and then to necessity—is not sufficient, of
course. The inaugural Sollen of the Critique of Pure Reason would have
to be allied with the imagination from the outset: reason ought to be able
to discover the freedom on which it chose to wager (practically demand-
ing an a priori theoretical self-knowledge) and recognize it as its own
phenomenalization. Needless to say, the third Critique could not have
been of any decisive help here, since it is not a matter of finding clues to
the compatibility between rational freedom and nature, but rather of
grounding all types of judgment in the freedom demanded by the
Sollen. What is schematized by the imagination, on this view, is free-
dom itself, or more precisely, the wager on freedom: finite reason’s
demand for an unconditioned freedom would thus be phenomenalized.
The imagination would be the self-schematization of the ought-to-be of
freedom, conceived as a perpetual poetic or “poietic” translation, or trans-
position, from possibility to actuality and then to necessity. The real, or
actual, is nothing other than problematic freedom fixed by the imagina-
tion into a certain form, against the background of a multiplicity of fluid,
transitory forms to which we adhere through belief. Moreover, if what we
experience is indeed the imagination’s phenomenalization of a freedom
that is demanded and believed, that freedom still depends on a contin-
gent given, and so there is no reason to fear a solipsistic disconnection
from the world. This freedom is not that of a res cogitans imprisoned
within its representations, but that of a correlation, i.e., a relation
between, on the one hand, the act by which the tribunal of the Critique—
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and, in the final analysis, of consciousness itself—establishes itself as
free and, on the other, the multiple portfolios to be judged, which the tri-
bunal welcomes as its alterities each time it makes a ruling on them
using its problematic powers, or forms them through the imagination. 
The difficulty is to successfully decompartmentalize the imagination
and the superior faculty of reason that, according to the introduction,
assigns itself its own problematic tribunal. But if I can be granted that
theoretical reason grounds itself in the free act of practical reason, at
least theoretical reason recognizes the rational idea (albeit belatedly, in
the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”) as a particular kind of
“schema,” or rather as “an analogue of a schema of sensibility,” which
aims to systematically unify empirical cognition (KrV A665/B693; CPR
602). In an important article devoted to the “fictions of pure reason,” as
he calls them, Claude Piché has perfectly characterized both Kant’s
tentative openness to the schematism of reason as well as the limits of
any such association.41 In general, we know the ideas, including the
idea of an unconditioned freedom—which, as I have argued, establishes
the tribunal, conducts the trials, and invariably constitutes knowledge
in its very problematicity—only through their faulty use, analyzed in
the Dialectic. In the practical domain, reason is absolutely productive,
immediately imposing its law (as well as its interest) on the will. In
the theoretical domain, reason must nevertheless produce these ana-
logues of the schema. Of course, the ideas are the residues of syllo-
gisms, which by definition can produce neither new cognitions nor a
fortiori new objects, at least not objects of possible experience. Indeed,
transcendental illusion arises when a syllogism is fallaciously directed
toward such a goal. An idea of reason (focus imaginarius, as Kant puts
it [KrV A644/B672; CPR 591]) is nonetheless produced thereby, and
Piché has endeavored to show “how reason engenders its schema even
before the latter is dogmatically interpreted as a real object.”42 In the
case of the Paralogisms, for example, the representation of the self as
the synthetic unity of apperception permits reason to act as if this
thinking self, arrived at by abstraction, were a separate, really existing
entity: the soul. But the regulating abstraction is not a real separation
or isolation (Absonderung). While reason may well provide the “I” of
classical psychology with the analogue of a schema, it must be careful not
to hypostasize it as an independently subsisting object. Hypostasizing is
itself an act of fabulation; reason only falls prey to this error because it
neglects to ask itself if the concept it has produced has an object. But at
least this concept has the analogon of a schema. 
This will still not suit my purpose so long as a practical imperative
really governs theoretical reason by its very performativity, whereby rea-
son’s wager occupies the space left vacant by the God of Schulmetaphysik
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and immediately engages the imagination as the power of occupying the
“nothing,” which is thereby open to possibility but always only potentially
realizable. In the third section of “The Discipline of Pure Reason,”
devoted to the proper conduct of reason with regard to the hypotheses
framed by the imagination, we read: 
Insofar as the imagination ought [soll] not to simply enthuse
[schwärmen] but rather to invent [dichten] under the strict over-
sight of reason, something must also first be fully certain and not
invented, or a mere opinion, and that is the possibility of the object
itself. (KrV A770/B798; CPR 659; trans. mod.)
This is also the condition for a valid hypothesis in Kant’s sense: the
imagination can contribute to forming an opinion—i.e., a cognition that
is fallible but has the potential for apodicticity—only based on the con-
ditions of the possibility of the object. On the one hand, Kant elevates
the imagination to a novel function in modernity, but on the other
hand, he binds it to possibility; it becomes a province of possibility and,
more precisely, a province of freedom. Ultimately, we encounter the
inaugural Sollen again, as Kant issues a verdict on the hypothesis in a
hypothetical form: if it is to contribute to cognition, the imagination ought
to (soll) be able to invent, yet without falling into the Schwärmerei ana-
lyzed long ago in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, which Kant regards as a
crucial anthropological reality, but one which is divorced from science.43
Thus he adds: 
we also cannot conceive of . . . presence except in space [or of] dura-
tion except merely in time. In a word: it is only possible for our rea-
son to use the conditions of possible experience as conditions of the
possibility of things; but it is by no means possible for it as it were
to create [schaffen] new ones, independent of these conditions, for
concepts of this sort, although free of contradiction, would neverthe-
less also be without any object. (KrV A770–1/B798–9; CPR 659)
This should all be clear by now. But that transcendental discourse as
such ought to be possible a priori (as in the introduction) is a possibility
that the philosopher has to grant herself in a circular manner through
the imagination. The real or objective cooperation between the Sollen
and the imagination, however, presupposes a practical schematism, which
the second Critique completely disavows. The demand that freedom be
intrinsically unconditioned yet nonetheless open to being phenomenal-
ized—and hence made finite—by the imagination may well correspond to
the first article of the “constitution” of which Fichte became the guardian,
to use Novalis’ famous formulation from the Logological Fragments.44 A
hypothesis framed by the imagination distinguishes itself from
Schwärmerei when it deliberately embraces the very form of our a priori
cognitive structures, i.e., the form of possible experience. But it was
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first necessary to wager on the very possibility of transcendental dis-
course as the necessary form of all possible reflection. Furthermore, this
“categorical hypothesis,” so to speak, presupposes that an uncondi-
tioned freedom can be schematized through the finite reflection of the
philosopher who has wagered on it, and the imagination thereby has
the task of always establishing a relation between the conditioned and
the unconditioned. 
The hypothesis that transcendental discourse, just like a utopia,
ought to be—whereby οὐ-τόπος refers to a place that does not exist but
that does not entail an exit from our spatial condition—constitutes the
prospective imperative of transcendentalism. This is a Faustian wager,
since in its finite condition the imagination only ever turns “something”
into an image when it obeys the understanding’s command to “form” a
given. What the imagination turns into an image is “nothing” when
Kant, according to the pure freedom suggested by the Sollen, schema-
tizes the possibility of this freedom by writing the Critique of Pure
Reason. The latter presents itself as a transcendental fiction whose prob-
lematic character must, paradoxically, be deemed “constitutive” insofar
as it is all that we “have.” Ultimately, the only experience we have is
always a problematic one. This is not to say that the “promised land,”
so to speak, of transcendentalism is merely a distant regulative idea:
the world that we have to offer here is in a sense far worse than a
world oriented only by such an idea, since we could just as well choose
to read transcendentalism as an apodictic discourse. Indeed, such is the
freedom of the philosophizing subject who commits herself to transcen-
dentalism and who shifts the meaning of the copula “is” on the basis of
a hypothetical “ought-to-be.” Rather, “the promised land of transcen-
dentalism,” in the very problematicity of the wager on its existence,
represents our only “constitution”—one that by its definition is always
subject to perpetual revision. This potentially apodictic constitution is
nothing: not in the sense of the ens rationis (the noumenon), but per-
haps in the sense of the nihil privativum, the “real effect = 0” of oppos-
ing forces. The opposing forces here are, on the one hand, freedom
asserted unconditionally by the Sollen, and on the other, all the forms
and finite products that this same freedom generates when it reflects
on itself and phenomenalizes itself through the transcendental imagi-
nation. This comparison of the transcendental constitution, or critical
fiction, with the nihil privativum is, of course, provisional, since the
latter designates an object,45 whereas what I have in mind is an act—an
act of freedom indissociable from the imagination through which it
establishes itself problematically. This “nothing” is irreducible to the
level of objectivity; it instead makes possible this level of objectivity,
although its own unconditioned possibility can never be proven or
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demonstrated.46 The “nothing” is thus the capacity to act of a problem-
atic freedom, which at least makes possible a problematic world—one
that must thus always be imagined.47
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free establishment of a transcendental fiction, which is not a thing but
has status as a “nothing” and has a “real” existence. 
47. Thus, I have not eliminated skepticism, which cannot be fought on the
terrain of arguments, as Fichte would later show, but on the terrain of
pragmatic action (see, for example, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Introductions
to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings (1797–1800), trans. and ed.
Daniel Breazeale [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994], pp. 7–35). Yet I have
“made a pact” with it, just as Faust, along with all of classical German
philosophy, made a pact with Mephistopheles and his negativity. This
implies that in wagering on its own possibility, transcendentalism funda-
mentally rests on an act of belief (Glaube), as Jacobi had clearly seen (see
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, “Open Letter to Fichte, 1799,” trans. Diana
Behler, in Philosophy of German Idealism: Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling, ed.
Ernst Behler [New York: Continuum, 2003], pp. 119–41, esp. 121). But
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whereas Jacobi rejects transcendentalism, Fichte will reply by fully
accepting and integrating the fundamental dimension of belief—properly
understood as the very business of transcendental philosophy. The impor-
tant §9 of the Grundlage of 1794 already bears witness to this position:
“As to reality [Realität] in general, whether that of the self or the not-self,
there is only a belief” (Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Science of Knowledge, trans.
and ed. Peter Heath and John Lachs [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982], p. 264; “Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre 1794,”
in Zur theoretischen Philosophie, vol. 1 of Sämmtliche Werke, ed. Immanuel
Hermann von Fichte [Berlin: Veit, 1845], p. 301). Transcendental philoso-
phy itself springs from a belief—and Jacobi himself refuses to believe it!
In the final analysis, the Kant I have presented in these pages remains
very “modern”: he is the son of Descartes’ Discourse on Method, for which
method is the path, the very act of walking along it. There is no definition
that could mark out the path in advance so that we could then progress
along it with our eyes closed, using logical arguments alone, since one
must first wander in order to know what one wants (to say). Reflecting on
transcendental language ipso facto involves putting language to work and
continually revising the very presentation of the transcendental aim. The
presentation itself is always “problematic” and resists any uniform codifi-
cation. Kant was brilliant enough to make us sometimes forget all the
implications of his act in spite of its audacity; with his scholastic style he
deftly juggles definitions, concepts, and propositions to make his points.
And yet, because it was sought after by the very project of a tribunal, free-
dom ends up being the surprise element of Kant’s first Critique. To be
sure, it receives a doctrinal outline in the second Critique, an outline
already foreshadowed in the first; yet in a far more fundamental sense,
the Critique of Pure Reason already “pre-forms” freedom as a problem,
lodging it in the very heart of the critical approach. Even when “Kantian
freedom” is reduced to an argument-type, whether moral or epistemologi-
cal, it still flows from the freedom to write a Critique, which the body of
the text does not always know how to handle since it had not foreseen the
effects of the free decision to conceive of philosophy as a tribunal, much
less one that is in principle incorruptible and impervious to any censure.
Many definitions of this freedom will be formulated further on down the
path; these have been expertly compared and assessed among others by
Paul Guyer in his Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), esp. pp. 125–32. It was nonetheless
necessary here to begin by wandering, to dare to use this freedom, which is
at first defined neither as Freiheit nor as Selbstständigkeit, thus opening up
a gulf that the Idealists and Romantics later make the center of their pro-
jects. This, no doubt, is what it means to imagine oneself as a modern.
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